Debt and Deforestation: A Tenuous Link by Angelsen, Arild & Culas, Richard
Debt and Deforestation:
A Tenuous Link
Arild Angelsen and Richard Culas
WP 1996: 10
W orking Paper
Chr. Michelsen Institute
Development Studies and Human Rights
Bergen Norway
ISSN 0804-3639
Debt and Deforestation:
A Tenuous Link
Arild Angelsen and Richard Culas
WP 1996: 10
Bergen, September 1996
CHR. MICHELSEN INSTITUTE
Development Studies and Human Rights
Working Paper WP 1996: 10
Debt and Deforestation: A Tenuous Link
Arild Angelsen and Richard Culas
Bergen, September 1996
Summary:
This paper examines the hypothesis that heavy foreign debt causes high rates of tropical
deforestation. Empirical evidence indicates that no universally valid link exists between debt
and deforestation - in either direction. After a brief discussion of the debt and deforestation
problems, the paper outlines two different frameworks for understanding the (possible) links
between debt and deforestation. It then considers various statistical analyses of the linkage,
and review some more detailed country studies. The debt crisis lead up to the widespread
adoption of structural adjustment programres during the 1980s, and the paper also addresses
the environmental impacts of the adjustment process.
Indexing terrns:
Debt
Structural Adjustment
Deforestation
Environment
To be ordered from Chr. Michelsen Institute, Fantoftvegen 38, N-5036 Fantoft, Bergen,
Norway. Telephone: +47 55574000. Telefax: +47 55574166. E-mail:cmi(lamadeus.cmi.no
Contents1 Introduction L
2 The debt crisis 2
3 The causes of deforestation 3
4 Linking deforestation to debt: two frameworks for discussion 64.1 Debt as a cause of deforestation 6
4.1.1 Structural Adjustment Programres (SAP) 7 .
4.1.2 Poverty and low economic growth 11
4.1.3 Export orientation - increased resource mining 12
4.2 Debt and deforestation have the same root cause 13
5 What do empirical studies show? 155.1 The simple statistical relationship 155.2 Econometric studies 18
5.3 Country studies - the WWF research programme 19
6 Global environmental markets 216.1 Debt-for-nature swaps 21
6.2 International markets for CO2 emissions 22
7 Summary and conc1uding remarks 23References 25Appendix 28
1 Introduction 1
A widely held view in the popular debate is that foreign debt of many developing
countries causes or aggravates their environmental problems: heavy debt burden
compels the countries to exploit the environment in order to service their debt.
According to this line of reasoning debt relief may be beneficial in terms . of both
development, economic growth and environmental conservation. There is a simple and
compelling logic to the debt-environmental degradation thesis. One needs, nevertheless,
to critically examine the alleged relationship and ask for empirical evidence.
This paper focuses on tropical deforestation for two reasons: it is among the most
serious environmental problems, and more data are available than for most other
problems. Thus it allows for statistical testing of the Telationship between debt and
deforestation. The discussion will also be related to other environmental problems, such
as desertification and soil erosion.
Hopefully, this paper may add some consistency and facts to a debate which at times is
both polarized and politicized. Environmental groups typically argue that there is a
strong link between debt and environmental degradation. They tend to see these
problems as part of the terms on which developing countries participate in the
international economic system, which also caused the debt problem in the first place.
Some Western governments and multilateral organizations like the W orId Bank focus
on domestic (national) failures, and seek to explain environmental degradation and the
debt problem as symptoms of more deep-rooted problems of mismanagement of both
the economy and the environment. Reed (1996: 1-2) uses the terms "externalists" and
"internalists" on these positions.
Section 2 gives a brief background to the debt crisis, whereas section 3 discusses the
causes of deforestation. A c1ear understanding of the mechanisms underIying
deforestation is necessar in order to relate the debt crisis to the deforestation process. In
section 4 we present two different frameworks for a discussion of the link between
deforestation and debt, corresponding to the controversy between environmental groups
and the W orId Bank just referred to. Then in section 5 we first explore the simple
statistical relationship (correlation) between debt and deforestation, before examining
some more detailed statistical analyses which have been done. We also summarize the
conc1usions from a WWF research programme on the environmental effects of structural
adjustment programmes. Some policy issues related to the creation of global
environmental markets are briefly discussed in section 6. We sum up and conc1ude in
section 7.
An earlier version of this paper has been published in Newsletter no. 2, 1995 from the Study Group of
North-South Issues ("Idegruppen om Nord/Sørli). We would like to thank Turid S. Bøe, Lual Deng,
Odd-Helge Fjeldstad, Ottar Mæstad and Arne Tostensen for constructive comments to the paper.
Responsibility for remaining errors isours.
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2 The debt crisis
Since the first oil price shock in 1973 there has been a general upward trend in the
international debt burden of developing countries. This debt accumulation has for many
countries not been sustainable, in the sense that they were not, and many are stil not, in
a position to service their debt. The unsustainability is a combination of two related but
distinguishable factors: first, the size of the accumulated debt, and second, the poor
economic performance of many developing countries over the past one to two decades.
In the earIy 1970s a worId wide capital market emerged to which developing countries
had ready access. The OPEC countries put a large share of their increased income in
European and American banks, creating favourable terms for borrowers, inc1uding low
interest rates and easy access. Western banks were not toa concerned about how the
money was spent and the creditworthiness of developing countries, i.e., their ability to
repay.
Borrowing money is not bad if it is used in away which promotes economic
development and (thereby) increases the abilty to repay the loan. South Korea and
Indonesia are examples of countries with large foreign debts, but no debt crisis. They
are, however, the exceptions rather than the rule. In most countries the capital inflow did
not have the positive effects many expected. A large share was consumed as it was used
to finance government budget deficit. Necessary reforms and economic adjustments
were thus postponed. The capital inflow also caused an appreciation of the exchange
rate (or less depreciation), thereby worsening the terms of trade and hampering the
development of export industries.
Whereas it is easy to criticize this policy ex post, it should be understood in the light of
the optimistic economic forecasts and the political c1imate two decades ago. For
instance, the WorId Bank in 1980 projected a price index of primary products from
developing countries to increase by 9.4 percent annually over the subsequent decade.
The prices turned out to decline by 0.9 percent annually (Little et aL., 1993: 27). The
policy should also be seen in relation to the hopes for high economic growth among
Third W orId leaders, and a general belief that foreign capital and state directed
investments were critical in promoting growth.
The second oil price chock in 1979-80 worsened the situation for most countries, and
economic recess ion ensued in the global economy. High inflation rates in the US made
the Federal Reserve tighten the money supply, which increased interest rates
dramatically. The debt crisis became a global issue when Mexico in August 1982
announced that it could no longer service its debt. The fact that it was an oil exporting
country that set in train the debt crisis ilustrates the significance of domestic economic
problems.
The debt crisis should be seen as the combined result of heavy borrowing in earIier
periods, poor domestic economic performance, higher interest rates, and global
economic recess ion following the second oil shock. The crisis was a result of both
external (international) and intern al (domestie) factors, but their relative importanee stil
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remains a controversial issue. An immediate result of the Mexican moratorium was a
reluctance on the part of major banks to continue lending. New bank lending to
developing countries dropped from a peak of USD 44 bilion in 1981 to 8 bilion in
1984 and 4 billon in 1987 (Litte et al., 1993: 21).
As developing countries are no homogeneous group, some distinetions need to be made
between sub-different groups of highly indebted countries. The main focus in the debate
has been on middle-income countries, particularIy those of Latin America, whose debts
were mainly to commercial banks. Of the total Third WorId debt of around USD 950
bilion in 1985, roughly 30 percent was owed by four countries in Latin America:
Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela. The low-income countries, mainly in Africa,
commonly have even higher debt burden in relation to GNP (GDP), but smaller in
absolute terms. Their debt was largely bi- and multilateral given on very concessional
terms.
To developing countries the debt crisis is partly reflected in the fact that they have a
large debt which they are obliged to repay, and partly that they are cut off from a
substantial source of foreign currency on which they have become dependent. But
probably most important, deep-rooted economic problems, which in part could explain
the crisis, became even more visible and acute. Later experience has shown that the
depth of these problems were underestimated initially.
The debt crisis spurred a number of economic reforms, most notably the structural
adjustment programres (SAP) which wil be discussed further in section 4. Over the
recent past repayments on foreign debt as percentage of exports have dec1ined in most
severely indebted countries, but the burden has grown for low-income countries (Jha,
1994). The debt crisis of developing countries is far from over. What has been achieved
so far is a reduction of default on international debt, and therefore the threat to the
international financial stability.
3 The causes of deforestation
Why worry?
During the 1980s, some 0.8 percent of the tropical fores t area was lost annually (FAO,
1993). Several countries had a deforestation rate of more than 2 percent. The global
concern has increased, both due to agenerally higher environmental awareness and
more accurate documentation of the costs of deforestation. At the globallevel, tropical
deforestation accounts for about 25 percent of the heat trapping emissions (Houghton,
1993). One should note that, contrary to widespread myths, a forest in balanee (no net
growth) has no net absorption of carbon. Old growth (primar) forests do not "c1ean the
air" for CO2, but more carbon is released into the air when the biomass is reduced.
Another global concern is related to the loss of biological diversity. This richest
ecosystem of the worId is estimated to provide habitation for between 50 and 90 percent
of all species on earth (WCED, 1987). In addition to global effects of deforestation is a
number of adverse loe al effects: disturbanee of hydrological cyc1es affecting ground and
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surface water supply, increased runoff, flooding and soil erosion, changes in local and
regional c1imates, loss of timber and other forest produce, etc.
What are the economic losses due to deforestation? Valuation of environmental services
provided by rainforests is stil inadequate, but the evidence so far gives some interesting
conc1usions, as pointed out in the overview by Pearce (1994). The value of non-timber
forest products or minor forest products is what the name suggests -- minor. SimilarIy,
the pharmaceutical values related to rainforest biodiversity is modest, only a few dollars
per hectare. On the other hand, the carbon storage value may be several thousand dollars
per hectare. The global community also seems to attach a high existence value to
tropical forests.2 The key conservation problem is that these are global benefits of
preservation, and not benefits accruing to by the governments and the milions of
farmers who take the resource-use decisions.
"The needy and the greedy"
A discussion of the causes of tropical deforestation should start by identifying the
primar agents of deforestation: who cut the trees? The two main types of agents
involved are what some have referred to as "the needy and the greedy". The needy are
the farmers who convert forest to agriculturalland, commonly practising the shifting
cultivation Cforest rotation) system. Agricultural expansion is often held responsible for
about 50-60 percent of overall deforestation, even though this share may be
exaggerated.3 Other deforestation activities by the needy are pasture and fuelwood
collection, estimates of their combined share are in the range of 15,.20 percent CJohnson,
1991; WorId Bank, 1991).
The greedy refer to commercial agents involved in deforestation. These activities of
these agents inc1ude timber logging, hydropower developments, plantations, and
commercial agricultural estates. This development is undertaken by the state directly, or
by private sector entrepreneurs enjoying favourable treatment by the state in terms of,
for example, generous timber concessions Ccommon in Southeast Asia), or favourable
tax rules that stimulate liland development" Ccommon in Brazil during the 1980s).4
About 20 percent of the tropical deforestation is due to logging, but the indirect effect
may be much higher due to the opening up of fores t for migrating agriculturalists.
The two different sources of deforestation are by some government also c1assified as
unplanned and planned deforestation. This may be misleading as it indicates that all
planned deforestation is socially desirable, whereas the unplanned is not. The difference
between the two types of agents may also not be as c1ear-cut as it appears at first. In both
cases those who are in a position to use the forest find deforestation the most profitable
alternative. The starting point for the analysis should be that the agents respond
2 Existence value refers to the value people attach to an environmental resource in addition to its use
value.
3 Uncertain estimates and definitions of deforestation, and an interest by govemments and others in
"blaming the poor" for environmental problems, may lead to too high estimates of the share of
deforestation attributed to expansion of traditional agriculture. See Angelsen (1995: section 2) for
further discussion of this point.
4 See Gilis and Repetto (1988)
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rationally to the costs and benefits of different types of forest use. The next question is
then what determines these costs and benefits, and how they can be influenced.
Market and policy failures
The key to understanding excessive tropical deforestation (and other environmental
problems) is that it entails large costs that are not counted by those who take the
decisions. The smallholder or commerciallogger have little incentive to care about the
c1imate effects of his or her actions. Such costs are labelled externalities in economic
theory: they are external to the individual resource user (decision maker), but not to the
(global) society. It is also referred to as a market failure, because an unregulated market
economy wil fail to produee . an optimaloutcome. It can also be viewed as a failure
because there is no market for global environmental benefits, to which we wil return in
section 6.
The market failure could, in principle, be corrected by governments, for example, by
taxing destructive uses of the fore st, and subsidizing forest uses which are compatible
with preservation of the protective functions of the forest. However, government
policies often tend to further aggravate the problem. These are referred to as policy
(government or intervention) failures, and is in this context loosely defined as
government policies that worsen the environmental problems instead of remedying
them. There are numerous examples of policy failures.5 The government of Indonesia
and some other Southeast Asian countries only capture about one third of the fores t
(resource) rent, defined as profit beyond the normal return on capital investments. It is
commonly considered that the resource rent should belong to the society at large (the
state or local communities). Thus, the failure by the state to capture the forest rent
makes excessive logging more attractive. Lack of respect for traditionalland rights, and
other distorted institutional incentives which make property rights to forestIand
uncertain, could encourage short-term exploitation rather than long-term uses.
Poverty and population growth
Poverty, low income growth and high population growth may further increase the
pressure on forest resources. There is, however, no unequivocal relationship between
forest c1earance and population growth. Among the factors influencing this relationship
is the availability of alternative employment opportunities. If a country is able to create
new jobs and keep unemployment low, one can reduce or avoid the pressure on natural
resources created by high population growth. Malaysia provides an instructive example
in this regard, and could be contrasted with neighbouring Philppines. Agricultural
expansion in the Philippines is often caused by push-migration from the lowlands, due
to lack of employment opportunities, and landlessness parly due to unequal land
distribution (W orId Bank, 1989).
Poverty is of ten cited as both a cause and an effect of environmental degradation
(WCED, 1987). It is unquestionable that environmental degradation in resource
dependent economies wil create or maintain poverty. The revers e causal link is more
complex. Obviously, poverty may lead to short-term thinking and is characterized by
5 Gilis and Repetto (1988) give the most comprehensive overview of such policies.
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lack of resources to invest in long-term conservation of the natural resources.
"Environmental thinking starts after breakfast", and with no breakfast there wil not be
much environmental thinking at all. However, case studies of environmental
degradation among poor groups of ten show that the main factor behind reductions in the
resource base have be en resource exploitation by outsiders, either by state-sponsored
projects, commercial interests, or other migrating groups.6
4 Linking deforestation to debt: two frameworks for
discussion
On the basis of our discussion so far, a framework for analyzing the debt-deforestation
relationship should seek to identify linkages between the debt problem and the decisions
made by the agents of deforestation. How does high foreign debt directly or indirectly
affect the costs and benefits of different land uses by different economic actors?
There is one formidable conceptual problem when discussing the effect of the debt crisis
on deforestation (or other problems), that is, the problem of defining the counter-factual
or reference alternative. What would have been the situation without the debt crisis?
Maybe no structural adjustment programres (SAP)? Maybe a different type of SAP?
Perhaps the debt crisis just speeded up economic reforms that would have been
necessary in any event? It is, of course, impossible to give a precise answer to these
counter-factual questions.
As discussed in section 2, the debt crisis is to a large extent a symptom of a deeper
economic crisis in many developing countries, but the debt crisis itself further
aggravated the crisis. One reasonable hypothesis would be therefore that some structural
adjustment efforts would have been required in any event, but not as comprehensive as
became necessary after the debt crisis became manifest.
4.1 Debt as a cause of deforestation
We consider three different effects of the debt crisis which could be relevant to the rate
of deforestation:
1. Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP): The debt crisis was probably the most
important factor, though not the only one, leading up to the widespread adoption
of SAPs from the early 1980s onwards.
2. Lower economic growth and reduced (opportunities for) poverty alleviation: A
high debt service ratio implies that resources are extracted out of the economy.
Further, it is argued that debt works as a very high marginal tax on any income
increases in the indebted country: a large share of the increase in income and
export value wil be used to repay the debt, hence the incentives to adjust and
carr the costs (e.g., investments) wil be low.
6 See for example Amirah and Johari (1995). For a further discussion of the poverty - environment
linkage, see Broad (1994) and Reardon and Vosti (1995).
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3. Export orientation: This has partly been included in SAP. But the simple fact that
foreign debts must be paid back in foreign currency, which is obtained through
export or aid, increased the pressure for more export earnings.
On the basis of the above, we have outlined in Figure 1 a number of possible links
between debt and deforestation. Below we offer a more detailed discussion of each of
the components.
Reduced input subsidies - -- I S llh Id . It
. ma o er agncu ure
/ SAP. Increased output prices -l \
Currency devaluation -
Reduced credit subsidies ~ Commercial agriculture
Cut in govt.ex enditur s ~ £
~ i ~~~+ e~
\ .. station
Poverty and low economIc wth Environmental /.
~ protection measure
E .. Loggingxport onentation
Figure 1: Possible causallinks between debt and tropical deforestation.
4.1.1 Structural Adjustment Pro grammes (SAP)
The Structural Adjustment Programres (SAP) were adopted by governments of many
developing countries with the prime objectives of economic growth and debt servicing,
through restructuring of the economy and improvement in internal and external
balances. SAP is conveniently separated into two different (but interrelated) sets of
policies: stabilization, emphasizing demand management, and adjustment, emphasazing
supply- augmenting measures. In the initial (stabilization) stages of a programre the
focus is on achieving a stable macroeconomic environment by reducing public budget
deficit (intern al balanee ) and achieving a realistic exchange rate through devaluation
(external balanee ). A balanced government budget normally implies cutting public
expenditures, together with other revenue enhancing measures like tax reforms.
The long-term and more difficult, but also most rewarding, part of SAP is the growth
enhancing (adjustment) policies. The policy prescriptions towards this end include a
number of microeconomic and institutional reforms, such as trade and price
liberalization, removal of (agricultural) input subsidies, privatization of government
banks, parastatals, marketing boards, etc. In practice, however, many of the policy
reforms inc1uded in the SAP package were never implemented, particularIy in
Sub-Saharan countries.
The adjustment policies implemented in many developing countries in the 1980s were
based on recommendations by -- or pressure from -- the international financial
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institutions (the WorId Bank and the IMF). The SAP reforms were necessary in order to
get access to multilateral assistance. Also from the mid 1980s bilateral development
assistance was increasingly conditioned to the recipient country having an agreement
with the IMF and the W orId Bank. Since aid is also being used to finanee budget
deficits, a country that did not accept SAP would have had an even higher budget
deficit, or be forced to make even larger budget cuts.
The SAPs implemented during the 1980s did not specifically address the environmental
impacts and conservation goals. There are several reasons for this omission (Reed,
1992). First, the environmental concern was not a priority for investments at that time.
Environmental issues had not reached the top of the international political agenda.
Second, the dominating view was -- and stil is to some extent -- that the environmental
problems were due to inappropriate macroeconomic and sectoral policies. By "getting
the prices right", one could address both economic and environmental problems
(win-win policies). Third, many feared that integrating environmental concerns would
induce more budgetary outlays. And fourth, any negative environmental effects of SAP
could better be addressed by mitigating measures tailored to specific problems.
This thinking stil informs the design of about macroeconomic reforms and how
possible negative social and environmental consequences should be tackled, but with
some important modifications as discussed in section 4.2. We think this position is
wrong for several reasons. First, social and environment al objectives are important and
equally worthy of inc1usion in economic policy formulation as is the objective of
economic growth. Second, there is no guarantee that the mitigating measures wil be
taken, in particular, it has not been part of the standard SAP package. Experience shows
indeed that this omission of complementary environmental policies has been the case
(see section 5.3).
Third, and most important, given that SAP policies have environmental consequences, it
is more efficient to consider these in the design of SAP. The standard practice of first to
design SAP based primarily on more narrow objectives of economic growth, and then
repair any environmental damage or take preventive action, is a more costly procedure.
Such a practice is c1earIy based on weak theoretical foundations. Given that one has
several objectives, it yields a better solution to use and design the policy measures with
respect to all objectives simultaneously, rather than to use the measures in isolation to
reach one objective at the time. Thus there are both cost-efficiency and political
economy arguments in favour of integrating environmental goals in macroeconomic
policy formulation.
Below we provide a discussion and some examples of how the vanous policy
components of SAP may affect deforestation.
Removal of input subsidies and decontrol of output prices
Removal or reduction of subsidies on inputs, such as fertilizers and pesticides, implies
higher prices to the farmers. This may partly or fully be compensated for by increases in
output prices as a result of deregulation. To determine the net effect on output prices one
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should also take into account the downward pressure resulting from removal of food
subsidies.
What are the environmental effects of both higher input and output prices? First, the
impact wil depend on the changes in profitability (gross margin) for the different crops.
Assuming that the profitability of agriculture in general increases, there are two
conflcting hypotheses on what wil be the effect on agricultural expansion, particularly
in the form of cutting primary forest:
1. Subsistence approach: This model assumes that the main objective for farmers is
to produee enough for their famly's subsistence requirement, and that they do not
give high priority to increased produetion and consumption beyond that leveL.
Higher output prices and profitabilty in this model would reduce the need to
expand agriculturalland. SAP would therefore be good for forest conservation.
2. Market approach: According to this view, the agricultural expansion is
determined by the relative profitability of farming at the agricultural frontier.
Higher output prices therefore mean that more farmers wil Bnd it worthwhile to
c1ear forest, both of those living there and through migration. SAP would in this
case increase deforestation.7
Which approach is the correct one? Whereas the answer would be area specific, the
subsistence approach may be relatively more relevant for short-term analysis, while the
profit-maximizing approach gives a better description of the long-term effects
(inc1uding the effects of migration). The subsistence approach would be relatively more
relevant in poor economies. In most cases both effects are likely to be present, so the
issue is which one predominates. Reed (1996: 329) finds that subsistence and
commercial farmers acted quite differently to new price signaIs, and along lines
suggested by the two above approaches, cf. section 5.3.
African countries that embraced structural adjustment programmes experienced
significant increases in agricultural production. The growth rate more than doubled in
reforming countries between 1980-1984 and 1985-1987, whereas it stagnated in
non-reform countries (Deng and Oshikoya, 1991). The main factor behind the growth
has been an expansion of agriculturalland, rather than intensification on existing land.
High rates of soil erosion, on average in the range of 0.5 - 1.5 of GNP, wil seriously
impede long-term agricultural productivity (WorId Bank, 1992).
SAP is also likely to influence the crop mixes. An example is given by Sankhayan
(1995) in a study of the implications of changes in prices of agricultural products and
inputs like fertilizers on cropping pattern and environmental variables in the Southern
Highlands of Tanzania. Area and production of tobacco, an internationally trade d crop,
increased at the expense of maize and beans. This change is likely to have negative
environmental effects by accelerating deforestation and soil erosion due to the increased
wood requirements for tobacco curing and differences in the cultivation practices.
7 These two different approaches are discussed more closely in Angelsen (1995: section 3.1) and
Angelsen (1996).
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Finally, SAP wil influence soil conservation practices. Ellis (1993) argues that higher
fertilizer and pesticide prices may encourage manual soil conservation measures and
integrated pest management practices by smallholders. Higher output prices have also
been assumed to give more incentives to invest realized profits in natural resource
conservation, and thereby the long-term productivity of the cultivated land. The latter is
likely to reduce the pressure on marginal land and forest resources. It is also being
argued that higher output prices results in higher land values, which again wil
encourage farmers to look at their land as a more valuable asset and pay more attention
to soil conservation. This is, however, only one of several possible effects. Increased
profitability may also encourage more intensive cultivation and thereby more erosion.
Currency devaluation
An overvalued exchange rate means that exports are discouraged and imports
encouraged, and import (export) competing goods discouraged (encouraged). We may
expect devaluation to induce a general switch from produetion for direct consumption or
the domestie market, in favour of production for export or import substitution. We may
also experience a general increase in the profitabilty of agriculture, which has already
been discussed above.
The environmental effects depend on the structure of agricultural produetion. Jf tree
crops rather than field crops are exported, a currency devaluation may be environmental
advantageous. In the uplands of the Philippines, tree crops are exported whereas annual
crops are produced for the domestic market. A devaluation would, therefore, have
positive effects on the level of soil erosion as tree crops cultivation is stimulated
(Coxhead and Jayasuriya, 1994). In some West African countries where groundnuts are
exported, the effect of a currency devaluation would be the opposite.
Stabilization policies and removal of credit subsidies
Stabilization policies like inflation control could be attained by tightening the money
supply. This is likely to result in higher real interest rates, both because inflation is
reduced and nominal interest rates may increase. Inflation control may enable the
smallholders to join the formal credit market since it becomes easier for them to save in
form of cash. This is likely to stimulate investment in agricultural produetion (and
conservation). SAP may, on the other hand, also induce cutbacks in credit subsidies and
rural credit programmes.
An increased use of credit may result in intensification of land use, and therefore reduce
pressure on forest resources based on the logic of the subsistence approach. However,
cash poor smallholders are not likely to have access to formal credit markets, thus the
main effect of SAP wil be removal of (subsidized) credit through government channeIs.
The result may be expansion on marginal lands and more forest clearing. This effect has
been present in Northern Zambia, where traditional shifting cultivation (chitmene) has
expanded after SAP was introduced in 1989 (Holden et aL., 1994; Culas, 1995).
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Cut-backs in government expenditures
Adjustment efforts significantly reduced (growth in) current government expenditures in
order to reduce budget deficits. Evidence from many countries suggests that social
expenditures are hit more severely than others, and it is likely that environmental
programres have received similarly low priority. This appears, for example, to be the
case in Mexico, where the environmental budget tends to be reduced more than overall
expenditures (Reed, 1992). Further, a long-standing argument is that investments are cut
more easily than current expenses when the budget balanee has to be improved.
The magnitude of the effect of cuts in current spending on environmental protection is
not expected to be very large, since in most countries there was not much to cut at all.
Other and more fundamental forces are more critical for the development than seattered
government interventions to protect the forests. Cuts in other government expenditures,
such as health and education, may have long-term negative environmental effects. As an
example, education for girls is among the investments with highest yields both with
respect to environmental conservation and poverty reduction (WorId Bank, 1992).
Reduced public investment in, for example, rural infrastrueture such as roads and public
services may have reduced the pace of fore stry and agriculture expansion by increasing
the effective cost of opening up virgin forest lands (Reed, 1992; Hansen, 1989). This
effect may be significant, as evidenced by the reduced "developments" in Amazonia in
the 1980s due to Brazil's debt crisis. Generally, road construetion is among the most
indisputable and unambiguous factors in promoting deforestation.
Other policy reforms towards the agricultural sector inc1ude land reform, commonly in
the form of introducing individual land titles. More secure land rights should improve
the incentives for environmental conservation, since farmers themselves are more likely
to harvest the fruits of conservation investments. The experience suggests, however, that
land reforms in the form of individualized titling programmes are difficult to implement
and often not successful (see, for example, Angelsen and Fjeldstad, 1995; Wachter,
1992). Moreover, in a situation where land rights are allocated based on forest clearing,
increased land tenure security may actually increase deforestation as the "deforestation
investment" becomes more secure (Angelsen, 1996).
4.1.2 Poverty and low economic growth
One of the fundamental issues of resource management in developing countries relates
to widespread and persistent poverty. Although a large share of the urban population
fails to meet its basic needs, absolute poverty is concentrated in the rural areas. Poverty
is associated with low levels of income and consumption per capita, poor employment
opportunities and a diminishing economic base as land becomes increasingly scarce and
unproductive (Omara-Ojungu, 1992). Poverty makes short-term survival requirements
dominate over long-term considerations. It wil also reduce poor farmers' capacity to
manage resources in a sustainable manner. Thus, farmers wil tend to overuse the
remaining land and move into forests and marginal lands.
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A heavy debt burden can aggravate poverty and reduce the income of the poor by
limiting the provision of various social services, and the development and maintenance
of infrastructures. Moreover, the debt burden serves as a tax on the improved economic
performance, as a large share of export earnings has to be used of for repayments. This
lowers the incentives for undertaking reforms which can improve economic growth: the
costs are borne fully by the country, whereas the benefits have to be shared with the
foreign creditors.
The costs of the adjustment efforts following the debt crisis have to a large extent been
shouldered by poor groups. According to Reed (1996: 331), "the dominant response of
the poor to downward pressure on their living standards is to increase pressure on the
environment and natural resources in order to survive" .
Even though poverty was cited as a major explanatory factor for environmental
degradation in the report of the Brundtland commission (WCED, 1987), the presumed
linkage could be questioned or modified. First, poverty implies that people may lack the
means to destroy the environment. Shifting cultivators may, for example, at some stage
be able to afford buying a chainsaw, which makes it possible to cut much larger areas
for cultivation. Second, some environment al problems are increasing with the leve! of
produetion and consumption. This is typically true of problems related to the use of
fossil fuels. For a relatively limited set of environmental problems, an inverted
U-shaped relationship between pollution and income has been suggested, with a turning
point of several thousand dollars of GNP/capita (an environmental Kuznets curve).8
The improve growth performanee of countries undertaking SAP has contributed to
increased environmental pressure (Reed, 1996), makng us face an unpleasant trade-off.
Another aspect related to economic growth is its impact on migration and resettlement
programres. Economic growth sometimes brings with it increasing income disparities,
as some parts of the economy (usually the "modern" sectors) grow faster than others.
Although total income levels are raised, internal income disparities may emerge to the
detriment of the poor. Thus, the failure to resolve this distributional problem within the
constraints of available resources, further encourage governments to pursue poverty
alleviation policies that are harmful to the environment, such as opening fragile virgin
land to cultivation (deforestation). The re settlement programres in the two largest
rainforest countries of the world, Brazil and Indonesia, are examples of a policy which --
at least parly -- can be explained in this way.
4.1.3 Export orientation - increased resource mining
There are different options available to a country in dealing with its debt problem, such
as debt rescheduling, debt repudiation, increased borrowing, devaluation of the
currency, restrieting imports, and increasing exports. The actual number of options that
are available to a country depends on its creditworthiness, export base and leve! of
development (Kahn and MeDonaId, 1994).
8 See Steer (1992), SeIden and Song (1994), and Grossman and Krueger (1995).
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The export of agricultural commodities and timber are major sources of foreign
exchange earnings for many developing countries, which indicates that this may be the
most realistie option for increased export earnings, at least in the short run. With little or
no concern for the future productivity of the forest and land resources, for example,
through reinvestment, this development entails considerable risk for the depletion of the
forest stock. The effect of an export orientation of agriculture has been discussed above.
Debt can also lead to myopic behaviour on the part of the government side, leading to
deforestation rates that may not be optimal in the long run, but found necessar in the
short-run to meet current needs. The imbalance created by overwhelming debt causes
countries to adopt short-term policies, designed to meet the next payment of interest or
principal, or to sustain positions in rescheduling negotiations.
On balance, one should note that there are also non-forest options to deal with the debt
problem. One could construct an argument that if a country could maximize its income
or net benefits through a particular rate of deforestation, then it would be optimal for it
to pursue this deforestation rate regardless of the debt position (Kahn and MeDonaId,
1994) .
A detailed study of the effects of SAP on deforestation in Bolivia demonstrates that the
adjustment proeess lead to increased pressure on forests (Kaimowitz et al., 1996). The
pressure came largely from large scale commercial agriculture (soya beans) and the
logging industry. SAP did not, however, contribute significantly to smallholder
migration to the fores t frontier.
4.2 Debt and deforestation have the same root cause
Whereas the WorId Bank (and IMF) did not inc1ude environmental goals in the SAP of
the 1980s, the environmental attention has increased markedly during the 1990s. The
revised W orId Bank view "represents a step away from neoliberalism and back towards
the Bank's attitude of the 1960s" (Taylor, 1993: 869). The main slogan, as underscored
in the 1992 W orId Development Report on development and the environment (W orId
Bank, 1992), is "win-win": improvements in environmental quality and economic
growth can be achieved simultaneously, and partly by the same measures. Furthermore,
environmental and economic problems are often explained by the same underlying
causes. A prime example is subsidies of fossil fuels (including coal) which in the report
is estimated to cost the developing countries (inc1uding Eastern Europe) about USD 230
bilion annually (WorId Bank, 1992). Removing these would reduce the CO2 emissions
by about 10 percent. Increased emphasis on education and family planning are other
areas which would be beneficial to both the environment and economic performance.
In this view, the debt and deforestation problems are due to general economic
mismanagement, a misguided policy for rapid (and unsustainable) economic growth,
public sector mismanagement, and elitist behaviour and corruption. These factors lead
to levels of foreign borrowing that cannot be sustained, particularIy when the borrowed
resources are not invested productively. Similarly, environmental degradation is also the
result of the drive for rapid growth, which lead to consumption of environmental
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resources beyond sustainable leveIs. Thus they were both attempts to increase
consumption beyond what the economy and environment could sustain (Shiling, 1992).
Debt Deforestation
~ /
Drive for rapid economic growth
Economic mismanagement and instability
Figure 2: The root causes ofindebtedness and deforestation
Before the adjustment reforms in the 1980s, many developing countries believed that
public planning of investments coupled with substantial foreign capital inflows could be
used to achieve sustained rapid economic growth and higher standard of living. The
policies relied on state and state-owned enterprises, and included control of natural
resources. But rather than acting to preserve these resources, they were of ten exploited
by national (elite) interests and foreign owners to increase income rapidly. As aresult,
the economic policy distortions led to debt accumulation and natural resource depletion,
but only rarely managed to deliver better standards of living for a majority of the
population.
Both environmental conservation and investments to increase the economic
performanee are reflections of fundamental problems of the economic and political
system: the problem of taking long-term considerations into account in today's
decisions, and problems of coordination, for example, the correction of market failures.
Thus, debt alleviation may confuse the causes and cures, and might lead to inequitable
solutions, validate inappropriate behaviour, and create moral hazards (Shiling, 1992).
A dominating view within the W orId Bank is further that the debt and environment al
crises are much more "an index of inability to cope systematically with multiple
resource limitations than any evidence of strong causallinks between them" (Shiling,
1992: 30). It recognizes that most developing countries need access to more technology
and resources if they are to improve their economy and protect the environment, since
most improvements in environmental policies require resources that are laeking in many
of the se countries, and their debts represent claims on these scarce resources. As such,
reducing the debt burden could help achieving environment al objectives as well as
encourage economic growth by giving these countries access to these scarce resources.
Thus, debt is not a major cause of environmental degradation, bùt reducing debt may
help improve the environment.
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The win-win strategies should c1earIy be pursued aggressively, as they remove the
conventional conflct between what is good for the environment and what is good for
the economy.But why are such strategies not implemented on a larger scale? A simple
and powerful explanation is that there are not only winners. Even though the overall
impacts on the economy and on the environment may be positive, there wil almost
inevitably be both winners and losers, and the latter group may have sufficient power to
block reforms. Behind proposals of a "win-win" nature at the aggregate level are hidden
severallower-level "win-lose" situations.
The approach may also be criticized for its neglect of international factors contributing
to the environmental and debt crisis. It also tends to overIook that even though a
universally valid causal link between debt (and SAP) and deforestation and other
environmental problems is hard to establish, there may be strong links for a number of
countries, which should not be disregarded, for example, in the design of SAP.
5 What do empirical studies show?
The main lesson from the above discussion is that it is impossible to draw firm
theoretically based conc1usions about the relationship between debt and deforestation.
There are a number of possible mechanisms linking high debt to high rates of
deforestation, and similarly a number of arguments pointing in the direction of a
negative correlation. We now turn to the empirical evidence. What do the data show?
5.1 The simple statistical relationship
A first step in the analysis is to seek to establish a simple correlation between debt and
deforestation. Figure 3 presents cross-national data for the annual deforestation rates for
the period 1981 - 1 990, and the debt service in percentage of total export in 1980. We
want to depict the impact of debt on deforestation, thus the debt at the beginning of the
period has been chosen for most part of our analysis. We shall also make references to
analyses using 1985 and 1990 data. The variable debt service ratio is meant to be a
proxy for the debt burden, although other measures are also used.9 Deforestation rates
are average annual deforestation in the period 1981 - 1 990, in percent of forest cover in
1980. Also other measures -- in our view more questjonable -- have been used, such as
deforestation as percent of population or of GNP. Some studies also use forest cover as
the dependent variable, of which the appropriateness should be seriously questioned
(Kummer and Sham, 1994).
Deforestation estimates vary considerably. 10 We have used the assessments made by
FAO (1993), which is considered the most reliable but stil questionable. The data are
generally based on national forest inventories, which varies considerably in definitions
of deforestation, quality and time periods covered. To estimate deforestation rates
(1981-90) a model with populations density as the only explanatory variable has been
9 For example, debt service ratio as percentage of gross national product (GNP), or total debt as
percentage of export or GNP.
10 See Grainiger (1993) for a crItical review.
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used. Thus the estimates II many cases reflect population growth more than actual
deforestation.
Annual deforestation 1981-90 as % of forest area 1980 (Y)
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Figure 3: The relationship between deforestation and debt service ratio.
Sources: World Bank (1995); deforestation figures are based on FAO (1993).
Figure 3 reveals no systematic correlation between debt and deforestation. The
regression line plotted indicates a very small and insignificant positive relationship. The
R-square, that is the share of the variation in deforestation that can be explained by the
variation in debt, is only 0.3 percent. Using the debtJexport ratio for 1985 instead of
1980 yields essentially the same picture. Thus, our first tentative conclusion is that debt
and deforestation are not correlated.
Dividing the sample into low and middle income countries (1980) reveals a positive and
significant correlation for low income countries, with an R-square of 13 percent. For
middle income countries, there is a weak and insignificant negative correlation. Using
debt data for 1985 gives no significant differenee between low and middle income
countries, for both there is an insignificant, positive correlation.
A geographical breakdown gives no clear picture for Africa (a very weak negative
correlation), a slight negative correlation for Latin America, whereas it is significantly
positive for Asia. Using the debt burden in 1985 instead of 1980 changes the picture: A
weak and insignificant correlation for Africa, a positive correlation for Latin America,
whereas the positive significant correlation for Asia (using 1980 data) has disappeared.
When using 1990 data, we find that the correlation for Asia has switched to a negative
one, whereas it is insignificant for the two other regions (and overall).
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In summary , the breakdown neither by region nor income level yielded any more firm
conc1usions regarding the relationship between debt and deforestation. The correlation is
generally weak, and the size and sign are very sensitive to the year used for the debt
burden.
In Table 1 we have c1assifÏed the tropical rainforest countries according to their debt and
deforestation rates. Only one country (Equador) had both high rates of deforestation
(above 1.5 percent) and a high debt service ratio in 1980 (above 30 percent). Note that
Brazil, the largest rainforest country in the worId and the country with the largest
deforestation in absolute terms, has re1atively low rates of deforestation in the 1980s
(0.6 percent). Generally, the high deforestation countries are over-represented in the
medium debt group (67 percent). See also the appendix for a complete listing of all
countries and their deforestation and debt ratios.
Debt service Annual deforestation 1981- 90 as % of forest area 1980
ratio, 1980 Low ( oi 0.5 ) Medium (0.5 - 1.5 ) High ( ~ 1.5) Total
Low ( oi 15 ) 8 15 4 27
Ethiopia, Rwanda, Burundi, Chad, Guatemala, El
Central African Nepal, Mali, Salvador, Panama,
Rep., Congo, Burkina Faso, India, Malaysia
Botswana, Papua Nigeria, Togo,
New Guinea, Gambia, Benin,
Trinidad & Tobago, Ghana, Zimbabwe,
Mauritius Sri Lanka,
Indonesia,
Colombia
Medium 4 12 10 26
(15-30) Sierra Leone, Niger, Tanzania, U ganda, Bangladesh,
Mauritania, Tunisia Malawi, Pakistan, Thailand,
Madagascar, Kenya, Nicaragua,
Zambia, Guinea, Honduras,
Senegal, Philippines,
Gabon, Myanmar, Jamaica, Paraguay,
Algeria, Venezuela Costa Rica,
Dominican
Republic
High(~30) 4 4 1 9
Peru, Chile, Brazil, Mexico, Ecuador
Morocco, Côte d'Ivoire,
Argentina Bolivia
Total 16 31 15 62
Table 1: Classificatíon of countries according to deforestation rates and debt service
ratios.
Sources: World Bank (1995); deforestation figures are based on FAO (1993).
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5.2 Econometric studies
Whereas we in section 5.1 considered only debt as a possible explanatory factor of
deforestation, econometric studies (regression analysis) try to determine the explanatory
power of several variables. It is possible, in fact, that debt may be a significant factor in
such an analysis, even though we did not find any general correlation in the simple
analysis above.
In view of the prominent position the issue has had in the international debate,
surprisingly few studies of deforestation have been undertaken where debt is included as
an explanatory factor. Brown and Pearce (1994), which is the most comprehensive
collection of statistical studies of deforestation, report only four studies. In summary,
two of them find that high 1evels of debt contribute to high rates of deforestation, one
fÏnds the opposite effect, whereas the fourth finds no significant effect.
There are, however, methodological problems connected with all of them, which we
shall examine below. Furthermore, there are some general problems related to
cross-country regression analysis (see Cappelen and Fagerberg, 1995). First, to get
meaningful results the explanatory variables mus t affect deforestation in roughly the
same way in all countries. The discussion in section 4 indicated that this is a strict
assumption. Second, due to lack of data there wil certainly be a number of omitted
relevant variables. If these variables are corre1ated with some of the variables inc1uded,
the estimates wil be biased, and we wil not know the "true" explanatory power of the
included variables. Third, important country-specific factors are difficult to capture in
such analysis. "General statements about the causes of tropical deforestation which are
based on cross-national statistical tests are of little value since that they virtually nothing
to say about deforestation within individual countries" (Kummer and Sham, 1994: 158)
A study by Kahn and McDonald (1994, 1995) on Third W orId debt and tropical
deforestation develops a behavioural model which suggests that debt can lead to myopic
behaviour, leading to deforestation rates that may not be optimal in the long run. Their
regression analysis is based on country-by-country data for debt, deforestation, and other
variables such as labour force, government spending and investment. They conclude that
debt is significantly positively correlated with deforestation under a wide variety of
assumptions and specifications. The measures of deforestation used are deforestation in
hectares per millon people, or per milion real GNP in US dollar terms, which appear to
be strange measures. Both debt and deforestation figures are averages for the period
1981-1985, thus there is little allowance for lag effects.
Shafik (1994) looks at the deforestation over a much longer time span (1961- 1986). He
conc1udes that there is no statistically significant relationship between indebtedness and
deforestation. Indeed, his main conclusion is that "there are very few macroeconomic
causes of deforestation at the aggregate leveL. Many of the variab1es often cited in the
literature - poverty, trade and indebtedness - are consistently insignificant" (page 95). He
finds two significant macro variables which contribute to deforestation: a high leve1 of
investment goes in tandem with high rates of deforestation. The sec ond factor is
political and civil liberties, but the correlation is not what we all would hope for:
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democratie societies have more deforestation! This may be an example of how statistical
correlation may be something very different from causal explanation. Nevertheless,
theories and potential causallinks should be validated by statistical testing.
Capistrano (1994) appears to be the most thorough study on the debt-deforestation link.
Unfortunately she limits the analysis to industrially logged forest. She divides the
analysis into four different sub-periods between 1967 and 1985, which makes good
sense. She finds that debt is a significant explanatory variable only for the period
1972-1975, and then the effect is negative: less logging occurred in the early 1970s in
the most indebted countries. One possible explanation is that high debt reduced the
investments in logging activities.
These results suggest that the link between debt and deforestation rates is tenuous.
Which factors at the aggregate level could then explain deforestation? In a summary of
some 20 studies in Brown and Pearce (1994), there are few unambiguous conclusions.
An exception is population density, which increases deforestation, whereas the effect of
population growth is indefinite. II Given that most deforestation figures, as in FAO
(1993), are in the first place estimates based on population density, this should hardly be
surprising. What is surprising, though, is the uncritical conc1usions commonly made
about the effect of population growth on deforestation, a critique well elaborated in
Kummer and Sham (1994). Finally, even a statistical correlation between forest cover
and population density (see Palo, 1994, for the evidence), do es not necessarily suggest a
causal relationship. It rray simply be a reflection of the fact that few people live in
forests.
5.3 Country studies - the WWF research programme
Given the problems associated with econometric studies of the debt-deforestation link,
detailed country studies could provide better insight into the mechanisms at work.
Among the most comprehensive studies in this field appears to be the research
programre organized by the WorId Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) on the linkages
between structural adjustment and the environment. Even though some may expect the
work sponsored by an environmental NGO to have certain biases, the two main books
published by the programre provide a pragmatie and agnostic approach, and the
conc1usions are well balanced. This contrasts, for example, a related W orId Bank study
on the impact of economywide policies on the environment, summarized in Munasinghe
and Cruz (1995). This report c1aims that "getting the prices right"-policies under SAP
"generally wil contribute to both economic and environmental gains" (page ix). Neither
the WWF research programre nor other studies support such agenerally optimistie
conc1usion.
The WWF research is documented in Reed (1992), which includes three countr studies
(Côte dIvoire, Mexico and Thailand), and Reed (1996), which summarizes the
experience of nine countries (Cameroon, Mali, Tanzania, Zambia, El Salvador, Jamaica,
Venezuela, Pakistan and Vietnam). A major conc1usion is that the environmental
impacts of the adjustments are mixed, and one cannot in general claim that the SAP has
i1 Obviously, high population growth leads to higher population density over time.
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made the environmental conditions better or worse. Thus there is no support to
simplistie views of a definite linkage in either direction. Beyond this general statement,
the studies report an number of interesting findings which have not yet been fully
appreciated in the international debate. Some of these are summarized below.
The SAP has been successful in promoting economic growth, and the improvement in
basic macroeconomic indicators are better for the countries that undertook structural
adjustment than for those that did not. However, SAP "did not move the countries to a
more sustainable path for two basic reasons: although price changes improved economic
efficiency, higher produetion levels increased aggregate environmental impacts, and the
economic reforms did not internalize environmental and social costs because requisite
policy reforms did not accompany the economic corrections" (Reed, 1996: xx).
Reed (1996) stresses that SAP should be viewed as the programratie means of
integrating the developing countries' economies in to the global market system. Removal
of both external (trade) and intern al market bariers and reduced government
interventions are "increasingly placing natural resources more directly under the control
of the international market system. .. Price signals from international markets ... are now
preeminent in defining the rates and conditions under which those resources are used as
well as who the beneficiaries wil be" (page 350).
What has been the implications of the new market incentives on the resource use?From
the nine country studies, the report concludes that "a principal response of extractive
economies to structural adjustment programs was to expand and intensify extraction of
natural resources to be traded on international markets" (page 329). The environmental
impacts have been quite damaging, and unsustainable rates of resource extraction in
sectors such as forestry and mining have of ten been further boosted.
The response of agricultural economies have been more mixed. Commercial farmers
have responded to new price signals by expanding and often diversifying produetion,
which may have both positive and negative environmental effects, depending on factors
like the type of crops being expanded, the degree of soil mining, etc. The response of
smallholders have been quite different. Deteriorating economic and social conditions
during the transition phase have lead to increased pressure on marginal land. The
removal of input subsidies in many African countries moved agricultural inputs and
credit beyond the reach of many small farmers, leading to more extensive land use
practices and deforestation. This is in line with the subsistence approach discussed in
section 4.1.1.
The SAPs clearly hold the potential for promoting both economic growth and
environmental conservation, as repeatedly stressed in World Bank publications (e.g.,
WorId Bank, 1992). In practice such win-win gains have often not been realized because
SAPs have not been accompanied by the necessary policy and institutional reforms. This
reflects both "the lack of intentionally to use the adjustment proeess to strengthen
national environmental performanee" (Reed, 1996: 328), and the fact that particularly
institutional reforms are much more difficult to implement than some of the basic
"getting the prices right"-reforms. SAPs have boosted the economic growth and
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provided new incentives for resource extraction, without undertaking reforms that could
counterbalance the increase pressure on the environment created.
The first study tried to examine more directly the relationship between debt and
deforestation. In none of the three countries (Côte d'Ivoire, Mexico and Thailand) did
the researchers find any conclusive evidence for the debt-environmental degradation
thesis .
6 Global environmental markets
The discussion so far demonstrates an insufficient integration in domestie policies of
global environmental concern related to particularly deforestation. It is therefore a
continuous discussion -- not at least in the aftermath of the Rio conference in 1992 -- on
how to create mechanisms at the international leve! which can promote resource
conservation in developing countries. Some of these measures are related to aid and
"green conditionality". In this section we discuss to other measures: debt-for-nature
swaps and international markets for CO2 emissions.
6.1 Debt-for-nature swaps
Debt-for-nature swaps are, simply stated, contracts between a tropical forest country and
another party (NGO, private company, or government) where part of the country's debt
is bought up, in return for the conservation of a natural area in the tropical country. 12
The direct effect of the contract is that a particular area (habitat) is protected. The
indirect effect is that reduced debt may have a number of additional positive
consequences for the country, including more environmental conservation, through
several possible channeIs. The contract makes it possible to fully compensate the owners
or users of the protected areas. In this way the government could solve the problem of
conservation vs. development without resistance from localland owners or users. The
deal may also strengthen the capacity to manage land resources in a more sustainable
manner (Panayotou, 1993).
This paper has questioned the significance of the indirect effect of debt reduction when
it comes to deforestation. It may, however, be possible to include in the contract other
conditions which attempt to direct the increased financial resources in the hands of the
government towards activities that wil enhance resource conservation beyond the direct
effect. However, we would like to emphasize that the direct conservation effect as well
as other positive effects of debt relief provides sufficient justification for debt-for-nature
swaps.
So far the market for debt-for-nature swaps has been very thin in terms of the volume
traded, and costly in terms of transaction costs. They are largely based on good-wil by
groups in the North, devoid of strong self-interests on the part of the groups buying the
debt. Hence, a more recent focus has been to look at the possibility of creating global
markets for tropical forest conservation, where both parties have a direct economic
interest in the deal.
12 See Hansen (1989) for a discussion.
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6.2 International markets for CO2 emissions
A fundamental problem with tropical forest conservation is the "global appropriation
failure" (Pearce and Brown, 1994). A large share of the benefits of rainforest
conservation are global, such as carbon storage, biodiversity conservation and existence
values. These benefits are not appropriated by the resource users, who take the decisions
that determine the fate of the forest. The users decisions do not reflect the global
benefits of conservation, and forest conversion becomes too large. The key issue is then
how to create mechanisms which allow the resource users, both at the local leve! and
national governments, capture some of global benefits of conservation.
The main global benefit of tropical forest conservation seems to lie in its carbon storage
function. Monetary estimates are typically in the range of USD 2 - 3 000 per hectare,
based on the costs of similar reductions in CO2 emissions in rich countries (Pearce,
1994). This compares very favourably to an annualoutput value of one hectare forest
converted to agricultural land of only a few hundred dollars. Thus, if the developing
countries where paid for letting their forest act as carbon sinks to reduce CO2 emissions
and halt the greenhouse effect, this would in many (most?) cases outweigh the costs of
forsaking all other uses.
Norway has already entered an agreement of joint implementation through the Global
Environmental Fund (GEF) with Pol and (converting from coal to natural gas) and
Mexico (energy efficient lighting). Private sector initiatives are also on their way, for
example, on forest rehabilitation in Indonesia, Equador and Costa Rica (Pearce, 1994).
These initiatives, like the debt-for-nature swaps, are small and not likely to change the
overall trends. A larger scale arrangement would be needed to make a significant
impact. Consider a proposal which has been around for some time in the debate: all
countries agree on a CO2 agreement, and each country is given a certain amount of
emission quotas, which can be trade d in an international market. The agreement should
include both emissions due to fossil fuels, as well as emission (absorption) of CO2 due
to changes in biomass (inc1uding de-/reforestation). This would create strong incentives
for the forest-rich countries to conserve their forest. They could now liquidate standing
forest by preserving it and selling (or buying less) CO2 quotas, not by cutting down the
forest.
Even with newevidenee about the greenhouse effect, a binding international CO2
agreement is not likely in the near future. Consider as an alternative a stabilzation at 20
percent below current emission leveIs, as recommended by the Toronto conference in
1988, where the tradable quotas are given to each country in proportion to their
population. This would imply huge costs to the rich countries. The United States, for
example, would have to buy quotas every year for an equivalent of 6 percent of their
GNP (Kverndokk, 1993). This also explains the resistance so far from countries like the
US against any binding climate agreement (although the US position has soften up
recently).
22
Another problematie issue with the per-capita allocation of quotas is that forested
countries would be severely punished for cutting trees. They could question why they
should be punished for reducing their forest cover, given that other (more developed)
countries have done the same decades or centuries ago? Any realistie quota distribution
must take into account a number of factors such as population, present emission leveIs,
etc.
Bergesen (1995: 57) concludes in a review of possible global climate regimes that
"while the theoretical attractions (of tradable quotasJ are indisputable .", the practical
and institutional obstac1es to such a system remain formidable. ... It may take a decade
or two before governments in North and South muster enough joint ambition and joint
political wil to permit joint implementation". In the meantime, the main role of
Northern governments wil be to provide technical assistance, capital and technology, in
particular to the energy and forestry sectors, and to push for domestie policy reforms.
In a global perspective a convincing explanation of (excessive) deforestation is the
"global appropriation failure", and the logical solution is to create international markets
for transferring some of the "wilingness to pay" for forest conservation to the resource
users in tropical countries. The large political and practical impediments to this
suggestion make us -- at least in the foreseeable future -- rely on domestie policy
reforms, and international pressure and assistance to move the policies in a
conservationist direction.
7 Summary and concluding remarks
We wil sum up our findings and views in five main points. First, whereas it is possible
to hypothesize about a number of links between indebtedness and deforestation, the
empirical evidence level does not provide support for the alleged general positive
correlation between debt and deforestation.
Second, even though a general link between debt (and other macro level variables) and
deforestation is hard to establish statistically and otherwise, it does not follow that such
linkages should be ignored when designing economic reform programres for individual
countries. For example, in some countries export promotion may be good for the
environment, in others it may have an advers e impact.
Third, the inability of most macro leve! variables to explain the rate of deforestation
indicates that the focus should rather be on micro level reforms. This would inc1ude
respect for property rights of traditional user groups, establishment of conservation are as
with buffer zones, creating local benefits of forest conservation (like the CAMPFIRE
project in Zimbabwe13), careful planning to avoid making virgin forest areas easily
accessible through infrastrueture investments (roads), and providing attractive off-farm
employment to reduce the pressure on forest resources.
13 Note that the main benefits accruing to the local population derive from elephant hunting licenses.
Additional benefits of even higher value could have been obtained for the vilages if they were allowed
to sell the tusks (ivory), but international regulations and environmental boycotts have made this
impossible.
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Fourth, we would question the validity of globallevel statistical analyses, parly because
of the immense data problems, and parly because the underlying assumption about
homogeneity across countries. Country-specific studies, and systematic aggregation of
micro level studies, seem to be a more fruitful approach to derive some generallessons
about how debt and other macro leve! and international variables influence natural
resource use. Indeed, the major drawback with macro leve! studies is the lack of clarity
and specification of the on-the-ground mechanisms behind deforestation. A firm
understanding (and modellng) of the decision-making process by the deforestation
agents is necessary to understand how macro leve! and policy variables affect
deforestation (Angelsen, 1996).
Fifth, there are a number of good reasons for debt relief, but reduction of deforestation
rates does not seem to be among them. It is also hard to find evidence supporting the
view that deforestation would have been less severe if the debt crisis had not occurred.14
We may, nevertheless, argue that indebtedness limits the range of options for
governments -- both for environmental conservation and environmental destruction.
Reducing the debt burden widens the opportunities for better environmental policies --
whether these opportunities wil be seized upon is another question.
14 Obviously, if the debt crisis was avoided because of better economIc management, the deforestation
rates could also have been lower.
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Appendix:
Country ADnual Debt service as pct. of export
deforestation
1981-90 1980 1985 1990
AfrIca
Algeria 0.8 27.4 33.3 59.4
Benin 1.3 6.3 3.4
Botswana 0.5 2.1 5.4 4.4
Burkina Faso 0.7 5.9 6.4
Burundi 0.6 9.5 16.6 43.6
Cameroon 0.6 15.2 10 21.5
Central African 0.4 4.9 11.8 11.9
Republie
Chad 0.7 8.3 5.1
Congo 0.2 10.6 19.6 20.7
Côte d'Ivoire 1 38.7 17.4 38.6
Ethiopia 0.3 7.3 10.9 33
Gambia 0.8 6.3
Ghana 1.3 13.1 12.2 34.9
Guinea 1.2 19.8 8.3
Kenya 0.6 21 25.5 33.8
Madagascar 0.8 17.1 19.6 47.2
Malawi 1.4 27.7 22.5
Mali 0.8 5.1 16.6 11.5
Mauritania O 17.3 19 13.9
Mauritius 0.2 9.1 11.5 8.7
Morocco -1.5 32.7 32.7 23.4
Niger 0.4 21.7 26.7 24.1
Nigeria 0.7 4.2 30.8 20.3
Rwanda 0.3 4.2 4.3 14.5
Senegal 0.7 28.7 9 20.4
Sierra Leone 0.6 23.2 5.7 15.9
Tanzania 1.2 25.9 16.7 25.8
Togo 1.5 9 27.5 14.1
Tunisia -1.9 14.8 24.9 25.8
U ganda 1 17.3 54.5
Zambia 1.1 25.3 10.2 12.3
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Country Annua! Debt service as pct. of export
deforestation
1981-90 1980 1985 1990
Zimbabwe 0.7 3.8 32.2 22.6
Asia
Bangladesh 3.9 23.2 16.7 25.4
India 0.6 9.3 9.3 28.8
Indonesia 1 13.9 19.9 30.9
Malaysia 2 6.3 22.3 11.7
Myanmar 1.3 25.4 51.4
Nepal 1 3.2 4 18.2
Pakistan 3.4 17.9 29.5 22.8
Papua New Guinea 0,3 13,8 10,4 36
Philippines 3.3 26.6 15.9 21.2
Sri Lanka 1.4 12 13.9 13.8
Thailand 3.3 18.9 14.7 17.2
Latin America
Argentina 0.1 37.3 41.8 34.1
Bolivia 1.2 35 29.1 39.8
Brazil 0.6 63.1 26.5 20.8
Chile -0.1 43.1 26.2 25.9
Colombia 0.7 16 29.2 38.9
Costa Rica 2.9 29.1 36.6 24.5
Dominican Republic 2.8 25.3 16.1 10.3
Ecuador 1.8 33.9 28.8 33.2
El Salvador 2.2 7.5 16.3 17.1
Guatemala 1.7 7.7 21.3 13.3
Honduras 2.1 21.4 17.6 40
Jamaica 7.2 19 36.5 31
Mexico 1.3 48.1 37 27.8
Nicaragua 1.9 22.3 4.1
Panama 1.9 6.3 6.9 4.3
Paraguay 2.7 18.6 12.9 11
Peru 0.4 44.5 7.9 11
Trinidad and Tobago -2.2 6.8 7.1 14.5
Venezuela 1.2 27.2 12.8 20.7
Sources: WorId Bank (1992, 1995); deforestation rates are based on FAO (1993).
29
Recent W orking Papers
WP 1994: 3
WP 1994: 4
WP 1994: 5
WP 1995: L
WP 1995: 2
WP 1995: 3
WP 1995: 4
WP 1995: 5
WP 1996: 1
WP 1996: 2
WP 1996: 3
WP 1996:4
WP 1996: 5
WP 1996: 6
WP 1996: 7
WP 1996: 8
WP 1996: 9
ANGELSEN, Arild
Shifing cultivation expansion and intensity of production: The open economy
case. Bergen, December 1994, 52 pp.
RAKNR, Lise
Do interest groups matter in economic policy-making? Reflections from a
Zambian case study. Bergen, December 1994, 19 pp.
B0RHAUG, Kjetil
Local government and decentralisation in sub-Saharan Africa. An annotated
bibliography. Bergen, December 1994, 58 pp.
ANGELSEN, Arild and Ussif Rashid Sumaila
Hard methods for soft policies. Environmental and soeial cost-benefit analysis.
Bergen, March 1995, 23 pp.
NORDÄS, Hildegunn Kyvik
South African manufacturing industries - catching up or falling behind? Bergen,
March 1995, 40 pp.
ANGELSEN, Arild and Odd-Helge Fjeldstad
Land reforms and land degradation in Tanzania: Alternative economic
approaches. Bergen, July 1995, 38 pp.
FJELDSTAD, Odd-Helge
Taxation and tax reforms in Tanzania: A survey. Bergen, November 1995,35 pp.
FJELDSTAD, Odd-Helge
Valued-added taxation in Tanzania? Bergen, November 1995,27 pp.
STOKKE, HUGO
Institutional approaches to the study of international organisation. Bergen,
February 1996, 23 pp.
TJOMSLAND, Marit
A discussion of three theoretical approaches to modernity: Understanding
modernity as aglobalising phenomenon. Bergen, July 1996, 24 pp.
MOORSOM, Richard
Affordable water and social equity: a baseline soeioeconomic study offour towns
in the Central Namib Desert, Namibia. Bergen, August 1996.
FJELDSTAD, Odd-Helge
Bistand og næringsutvikling. Noen kommentarer til St. meld. nr. 19 (1995-96).
Bergen, august L 996, 17 s.
RAKNR, Lise and Tor SKÅNES
Political institutions and economic reform: Zambia and South Africa in
comparative context. Bergen, September 1996, 44 pp.
RAKNR, Lise
Rational choice and the problem of institutions. A discussion of rational choice
institutionalism and its application by Robert Bates. Bergen, September 1996,31
pp.
ARIFIN, Bustanul
Economic analysis of land degradation in Indonesia up land. Bergen, September
1996, 20 pp.
PAUSEWANG, Siegfried
"Eneweyay" (Lets Discuss). Bergen, September 1996.
ANGELSEN, Arild
Deforestation: Population or market driven? Diferent approaches in modellng
agricultural expansion. Bergen, September 1996, 30 pp.
